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Explaining Bond Spreads Via Default Risk, Taxes, Rating Transition
and Liquidity
Dean Johnson and Howard Qi*
Michigan Technological University

Abstract
This study develops a semi-structural framework of bond pricing that incorporates
default risk, taxes, and bond rating transition, whereas prior papers have primarily
focused on the first (and more recently the second) factor. After capturing the three
effects, the remaining spread between corporate bond rates and risk free rates can
intuitively be attributed to liquidity. Models estimated without all three effects cannot
intuitively dismiss the "unexplained" spread as a liquidity premium. This is confirmed by
applying the framework to samples from two periods (1973-1993, and 2004-2010).
JEL: G24, G30

*Address: School of Business and Economics, MTU, 1400 Townsend Dr., Houghton, MI 49931. Email:
howardqi@mtu.edu, phone: 906-487-3114. We thank Manfred Frühwirth and Sonia Goltz for helpful
comments, as well as seminar participants at the 2006 Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting and
Michigan Tech University Research Seminar.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we generalize the structural models for defaultable taxable bonds to
incorporate rating transition estimated exogenously. The incorporation of rating transition
is not an arbitrary decision. First, as we show, it improves the structural model calibration
procedure which originally ruled out the possibility of rating migrations before default.
Second, since ratings and the fundamental change in issuers’ risks are not accurately
reflected or instantly correlated,1 it is sensible to model the investors’ pricing process as
the expectation of the underlying risks signaled by ratings. Third, as we demonstrate, the
unexplained spread component in structural models with default and personal taxes alone
displays a strong rating-related pattern. A consistent and robust finding is that default and
taxes have the least explanatory power for BBB ratings in terms of percentage of the
observed spreads. This is direct evidence of rating transition risk being priced. If
transition risk is ruled out, one would have to accept the conclusion that junk bonds are
more liquid than investment grade bonds, which is extremely counter-intuitive since
many institutional investors are prohibited from investing in junk bonds.
These observations indicate that the unexplained spread component left by default and
tax-related premia is very hard to attribute to liquidity risk alone. Instead, it strongly
suggests a very different factor is at work – rating transitions. Accordingly, we would
expect to remove or greatly reduce the bothersome rating-specific pattern in the
unexplained spread, mitigate the over-shooting problem for low rate bonds and create an
intuitive liquidity premium. These suppositions are shown to be true in our model.
2. Background
Most structural bond pricing models based on default risk can explain only a very small
portion of the observed spreads for investment-grade bonds. On the other hand, the
models appear to be able to explain a significant portion of the observed spreads for low
grade bonds, and in some cases, even exceed or "overshoot" the observed values. Both
are problems in structural models that deserve investigation.
Jones et. al. (1984) demonstrated that the Merton-type model predicts a credit spread well
below the observed yield spread, especially for high-grade bonds.2 Since then many
structural models have emerged to incorporate other factors: stochastic interest rates
(Longstaff and Schwartz 1995), endogenous default, (Black and Cox 1976, Leland 1994,
1998, and Leland and Toft 1996), strategic default by stockholders, (Anderson and
Sundaresan 1996, Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon 1996, and Mella-Barral and
Perraudin 1997), and stationary leverage ratios (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein 2001).3

1

See Kliger and Sarig (2000), and Altman and Rijken (2004).
See Helwege and Turner (1999) and Elton et. al. (2001).
3
In addition, Duffie and Lando (2001) consider noisy accounting information. Zhou (2001) incorporates
jump risk. Goldstein et. al. (2001) include dynamic capital structure.
2
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Despite these efforts, there is no fundamental improvement in predicting credit spreads
(see Lyden and Saraniti 2000; and Eom et. al. 2004). Huang and Huang (2003)
investigated most representative structural models only to find that their performance is
fairly stable for different parameter choices and credit risk accounts for only a very small
portion (20 to 30 percent) of the spread for high-grade bonds. The performance appears
to be better for low-grade bonds, but the enhanced explanatory power may be spurious
because of the overshooting problem of the structural models for junk bonds (e.g., see
Eom et. al. 2004). Therefore, the performance of these structural models is far from
satisfactory and reliable for all ratings.
One factor previously ignored in term structure models is personal taxes. It has been
found that personal taxes explain a significant portion of corporate bond spreads. In many
cases, the tax premium exceeds the default premium (Elton et. al. 2001). Further, tax
effects with endogenous capital structures demonstrate rich interactions with default risk
and have direct influences on bond prices. The tax effects also have a strong impact on
capital structure, which in turn indirectly affects bond prices (Liu et. al. 2006).
The primary focus to date has been on the explanatory power of these models without
careful thought to the "unexplained" portion of the spread, which is typically attributed to
the unobservable liquidity factor. Naturally, if the model completely explained the
spread, one would not need to bother with the unexplained spread. Driessen (2005)
attempted to decompose credit spreads into the default-, liquidity- and tax-driven
components. As we will show here, while personal taxes improve the model's descriptive
power, the resulting pattern in the "unexplained" spread is not intuitively related to
liquidity.
To date, bond rating transitions have not been combined with the structural models. In
reality, most firms experience downgrades before they end up in bankruptcy. Graham and
Harvey (2001) found that CFOs ranked bond ratings higher than the tax advantage of
interest deductibility when determining their capital structure. According to Kisgen
(2006), “firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity
than firms not near a change in rating.” Indeed, the concern for credit ratings is justified.
Credit ratings determine whether many institutional investors are allowed to hold a firm’s
bonds.
Many rating-based reduced-form models have been developed. The two most widely
used are by Duffie and Singleton (1997) and Jarrow et. al. (1997). One may ask whether
ratings simply reflect fundamental change in issuers’ risks or whether they carry some
additional information value. Kliger and Sarig (2000) showed that rating information
does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value
decreases (rises) when Moody’s announces better (worse) than expected ratings. This
effect implies that the rating’s signaling is not accurate. Investors tend to believe that
bond ratings are slow in responding to changes in corporate credit quality.4 Similar
findings are reported in the surveys by Ellis (1998) and Baker and Mansi (2002).
4

See, e.g., Altman and Rijken (2004).
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Therefore, (1) bond ratings are an important factor in determining bond prices; (2) they
are dynamic in nature; and (3) they contain additional information value.
3. Model Calibration and Rating Transitions
Our calibration procedure finds its root in Huang and Huang (2003). The essence of the
procedure is to choose the unobservable parameters (e.g., asset volatility) such that the
model generates other variables (e.g., cumulative default probability, equity premium,
etc.) that match the observed values. This procedure is used to make sure that we did not
obtain spurious results. For example, a model may appear to perform very well, but we
may find that the seemingly accurate model-generated spread is mainly due to an
unrealistically high model-implied default risk. Therefore, the true performance of a
model is the accuracy of the generated spread when the implied default risk is adjusted to
match the observed values.
In this paper, we applied the models to 4- and 10-year bonds. The aggregate bond data for
the period 1973-1993 from Huang and Huang (2003) is used for direct comparability.
The target values of the selected parameters and the observed aggregate historical spreads
for each bond rating are given in Table 1.
For tractability, we assume away tax-timing effect if the bonds are traded before maturity.
The long-term capital gains tax rate is a fraction α of the regular income tax rate τ. Tax
rates applied to capital gains and losses are equal and there is no limit on loss deduction.
In the event of default, a portion of the principal (or residual) is paid, and the remaining
loss is treated as capital loss immediately deductible from an investor’s taxable income.5
The rating transition is accounted for by applying our endogenously obtained spreads to a
rating transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure.6 This should capture
two effects that have not been previously considered in models: First, the probability of a
firm assigned one rating having its true fundamentals similar to those in other ratings, i.e.,
the imperfectness of rating-based information; second, the probability of a firm indeed
migrating among different rating categories before the bond maturity.

5

Interest income and short-term capital gains are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate while long-term
gains are taxed at a lower capital-gains rate. The ordinary income tax rate for the highest income group is
35% for both individuals and corporations. Corporate bond income is subject to state taxes but Treasury
bond income is not. Maximum state marginal income tax rates generally range from five to ten percent, per
Commerce Clearing House (1997) and Elton et. al. (2001). The effective tax rate of corporate bonds is
equal to τ = τF + τS(1 - τF), where τS is the state income tax rate and τF is the federal income tax rate. The
last term reflects that state taxes are deductible from income for the purpose of federal taxes. Amortization
is an important feature of bond investments. We assumed straight-line method.
6
The observed transition matrices are not appropriate for such operations. The existence of a unique
transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure is implied by the assumption of market
completeness. We thank Manfred Frühwirth for this observation.
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TABLE 1
TARGET PARAMETERS FOR MODEL CALIBRATION
This table shows the values of the target parameters used for model calibration. The last two columns include the
average observed yield spreads. The target data are from Huang and Huang (2003) for the period 1973-1993. We set
recovery rate for the LT model to 80% per Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Eom et. al. (2004), which indicates that the
cost of financial distress is in the range of 15 to 20 percent of the firm’s going concern value. We set the target recovery
rate to 80% for the LT model. For the CG model, recovery is defined as a percentage of bond face value regardless of
debt maturity, and we set the recovery rate to 50 percent, similar to that used in Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
and Huang and Huang (2003).

Credit
Rating
AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

Target Parameters for Model Calibration
10-Year
Equity
4-Year Cumulative
Cumulative
Premium
Default Probability
Default Probability
(%)
(%)
(%)
5.38
0.04
0.77
5.60
0.23
0.99
5.99
0.35
1.55
6.55
1.24
4.39
7.30
8.51
20.63
8.76
23.32
43.91

Observed Average Yield
Spread
4-Year
Bond
(bps)

10-Year
Bond
(bps)

55
65
96
158
320
470

63
91
123
194
320
470

We followed the procedure of Wei (2000) to construct our rating transition matrix. That
is, we adopted the risk neutral 1-year rating transition matrix estimated by Wei (2000).
Next we derived the 4- and 10-year transition matrices by assuming the transition is
purely Markovian and time-homogeneous.7 Furthermore, we normalized the transition
matrices by redistributing the probability mass for categories other than AAA through B.
This was required to isolate the transition effect from default risk (i.e., probability of
migrating to default), noises from not-rated categories, and the possibility of withdraw (or
withdrawn ratings). These standard adjustments are normally made to smooth the
transition probabilities (see for example, Wei 2000, and Carty 1997). Table 2 shows the
4- and 10-year rating transition matrices we used in this study.

7

These two assumptions are commonly used in literature, e.g., Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), to
simplify the computation, although there has been research showing that these two assumptions may not
hold well due to the “momentum effect” (see Bahar and Nagal 2001).
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TABLE 2
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX UNDER THE EQUIVALENT MARTINGALE MEASURE
Panel A is the accumulative four-year rating transition matrix, and panel B is the accumulative 10-year rating transition
matrix. Both are derived from the one-year transition matrix under the equivalent martingale measure given in Wei
(2000). Given ratings below B and other not-rated (NR) categories are not considered, the transition matrices are
normalized to 100 percent for all possible migrations among AAA through B ratings (see Wei 2000, and Carty 1997).
Panel A: Four-year accumulative rating transition matrix (%)

AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

AAA

AA

A

BBB

BB

B

Total

77.17
2.14
0.31
0.13
0.12
0.10

18.67
71.92
7.10
1.35
0.42
0.92

3.38
21.73
73.23
14.97
3.16
3.43

0.58
3.30
15.81
67.55
19.46
8.44

0.15
0.52
2.50
12.17
56.52
37.77

0.05
0.39
1.04
3.83
20.33
49.32

100
100
100
100
100
100

Panel B: Ten-year accumulative rating transition matrix (%)
AAA

AA

A

BBB

BB

B

Total

AAA
AA
A
BBB

53.08
3.60
0.81
0.38

30.59
47.29
11.71
3.99

12.27
34.98
52.95
24.49

3.01
10.47
24.86
46.05

0.68
2.34
6.43
16.41

0.36
1.32
3.24
8.69

100
100
100
100

BB
B

0.30
0.25

1.74
1.46

10.42
6.21

28.60
14.80

33.46
27.87

25.48
49.41

100
100

4. Risky Bond Pricing with Default Risk, Taxes and Rating Transitions
The tax-related premium cannot be separated from the default premium.8 In addition,
personal taxes affect the optimal leverage, which in turn affect corporate bond pricing
and yield spread; therefore taxes must be incorporated under specific capital structure
assumptions. We next develop models for exogenous and endogenous leverage and rating
transitions.
4a. Exogenous Leverage
We start by extending the basic framework of Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein model
(2001), hereafter the CG model. It assumes a stationary mean-reverting leverage ratio.
The CG model is a two-factor model where the spot rate rt follows the Vasicek (1977)
process and the firm value Vt follows a geometric Brownian motion. Default occurs when
the firm value hits the bankruptcy threshold K, or lt = log(K / Vt ) = 0 . The firm value Vt
is specified under the risk-neutral measure (Π) by:
8

For example, the tax rebate is directly related to the timing of default and the value of recovery.
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dVt
Π
= (rt − δ )dt + σdz1 (t )
Vt

(1)

where δ is the payout ratio and σ is the volatility parameter. The risk-free tax-free spot
rate rt obeys the following process:
Π

(2)

drt = β (θ − rt )dt + ηdz 2 (t )
Π

Π

where β, θ and η are constants with dz1 dz 2 = ς dt . The log-default threshold kt is
mean-reverting:

dk t = λ[ yt −ν − φ (rt − θ ) − k t ]dt

(3)

where yt = log Vt , ( yt − ν ) sets the target threshold with ν and λ adjusting the meanreverting speed, and φ ≥ 0 . This stationary process reflects the fact that firms tend to
issue additional debt when their leverage ratio falls below some target and are less willing
to replace maturing debt when it is above that target.
If default does not occur before maturity T, the bond investor receives the principal
scaled to a unit payoff at T. Otherwise, a fractional loss in principal, L, is incurred. The
price of a risky tax-free bond is thus given by:

P T (r0 , l 0 ) = D(r0 , T ) [1 − LQ T (r0 , l 0 , T )]

(4)

where D(r0 , T ) is the price of the risk-free zero-coupon bond and Q T (r0 , l 0 , T ) is the
cumulative probability of default before T under the T-forward measure. Using the
method of the first passage time probability density and discretizing the interest rate
range (with a lower bound rL and an upper bound rU) into nr equal intervals by
ri = rL + iΔr = rL + i × (rU − rL ) / nr for i ∈ (1,2,..., nr ) and time into nT equal intervals
with t j = jT / nT = jΔt for j ∈ (1, nT ) , where Δt = T / nT , QT(r0, l0, T) at time zero is:
T

nT

nr

Q (r0 , l0 , T ) = ∑∑ q(ri , l0 , t j )

(5)

j =1 i =1

where l0 is the initial leverage ratio and q(ri, l0, tj) is the probability mass in a grid (∆r ×
∆t) at the level of (ri, tj). The specific form of q(ri, l0, tj) is given in Colin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2001).
For defaultable coupon bonds, we assumed that the unpaid coupons have a 100% writedown, i.e., the coupon loss rate Lcoupon = 1 . If default does not occur, the bondholder pays
a regular income tax on each coupon and a capital gains tax on the difference between the
principal and purchase price. If default occurs before maturity, the bondholder receives
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(1 – L) of face value, and a tax rebate based on the capital gains tax rate ατ, where τ is
the ordinary income tax rate and α is equal to 1 if the loss is short term or less if it is long
term. According to Qi et. al. (2010), the price of the risky taxable coupon bond with
straight-line amortization is:9

P T (r0 , l 0 ) =

M ⎡
⎛
ατ × t m
Z M + ∑ ⎢⎜⎜ (1 − ατ )(1 − L ) +
tM
m =1 ⎣⎝

1−

τ
tM

M

∑Z

m

−

m =1

ατ
tM

⎞ ⎤ M ⎡
τ
⎟⎟ Γm ⎥ + ∑ ⎢(1 − τ )c −
tM
⎠ ⎦ m =1 ⎣

M

∑ [(t

M

⎤
⎥ Z m
⎦

(6)

− t m )Γm ]

m =1

where,

Γm = D(r0 , t m ) ΔQ T (r0 , l 0 , t m )

[

(7)

]

(8)
Z m = D(r0 , t m ) 1 − Q T (r0 , l 0 , t m )
D(r0 , t m ) is the price of the risk-free tax-free zero coupon bond with maturity t m , and

ΔQ T (r0 , l 0 , t m ) is the incremental default probability over time period (t m−1 , t m ] under the
T-forward measure using D(r0 , t m ), the price of riskless tax-free bond with maturity
t = t m , as the numeraire.
4b. Endogenous Leverage
The Leland-Toft Model (1996), hereafter the LT model, is based on the tradeoff between
the benefit of corporate tax shields and the costs associated with bankruptcy. The firm
can endogenously choose a bankruptcy boundary which maximizes firm value. The
optimal leverage is therefore set endogenously. Firm value of an unlevered firm, V, is
assumed to follow the diffusion process:

dV
= [µ (V , t ) − δ ]dt + σdZ
V

(9)

where µ (V , t ) is the expected rate of return on the firm’s asset, δ is the total payout
ratio,10 Z is a standard Wiener process, and σ is the volatility parameter.11
The LT model assumes the firm issues debt continuously to replace the debt that is
expiring, hence maintaining stationary leverage. Within a unit of time, say one year, the
firm issues debt d that has a continuous constant coupon flow c(t), principal p(t ) , and
9

We have studied cases with and without amortization. The difference in the results is small, thus we only
present “with-amortization” framework. All the results are available upon request.
10
This is a proportion of firm value paid to all security holders.
11
A similar process was used by Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), and Brennan and Schwartz (1978).
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maturity t. The asset value process of the levered firm continues without time limit until it
hits a default boundary VB, at which the firm defaults on its debt. Upon default,
bondholders receive a fixed portion ρ of the asset value VB, or (1 – ρ) is the fraction of
firm value lost due to default. Suppose the firm continuously issues new debt with
maturity T years as long as the firm remains solvent. The value of all outstanding debts D
is determined by integrating d (V , VB , t ) over the period of T:
T

D (V ,VB , T ) =

∫ d (V ,V , t )dt

(10)

B

t =0

The levered firm value equals the unlevered firm value plus leverage benefits less
bankruptcy costs. Given the unlevered asset value V(t), equity value E(V , VB , T ), tax
benefit h(V , VB ) of leverage, bankruptcy cost B(V ,VB ), and outstanding debt D(V , VB , T ),
the levered firm’s value W (V , VB , T ) is:

W (V ,VB , T ) = V + h(V ,VB ) − B(V ,VB )

(11)

a+ z
⎛ (1 − τ C )(1 − τ E ) ⎞ C ⎡ ⎛ VB ⎞ ⎤
h(V ,VB ) = ⎜1 −
1
−
⎟ ⎢ ⎜ ⎟ ⎥
1−τ
⎝
⎠ r ⎣⎢ ⎝ V ⎠ ⎦⎥

(12)

where

⎛ V ⎞
+ τ EC E (V ,VB , T ) ⎜ B ⎟
⎝ V ⎠

⎛ V ⎞
B(V ,VB ) = (1 − ρ ) VB ⎜ B ⎟
⎝ V ⎠

a+ z

a+ z

r − δ − (σ 2 / 2)

(13)

⎛ V ⎞
[(aσ 2 ) 2 + 2rσ 2 ]1 / 2
⎜
⎟
,
,
, and τ C is the corporate
z
=
b
=
ln
⎜ V ⎟
σ2
σ2
⎝ B ⎠
income tax rate, τ E is the effective tax rate on equity returns, and τ EC is the capital gains
tax rate on equity appreciation.12 Both dividends and capital gains (or losses) of equity
are subject to taxes. Dividend income is taxed at the ordinary income tax rate τ, whereas
capital gains are taxed at τ EC = ατ . 13 The effective tax rate on equity returns τ E is the
weighted average of dividend and capital gains tax rates. Graham (2003) suggests that the
effective equity tax rate is τ E = (1 − δ )ατ + δτ where the weight depends on the payout
ratio δ .14 Given the par-bond condition assumed in the LT model, Liu et. al. (2006)
showed the price of the firm’s new debt (per unit of time) is:
where a =

12

For the derivation of (12) and (13), see Leland and Toft (1996) and Qi et. al. (2010).
This tax treatment holds for the sample period of the data we use to calibrate the model.
14
See Graham (2003, p. 1095; 2000, p. 1912; 1999, p. 153).
13
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p(T ) =

(1 − τ )c − e−rt (1 − τ )c [1 − F (T )] + ⎡(1 − ατ )ρ (T )V
r

{

⎢⎣

r

}

1 − ατ e −rt [1 − F (T ) + G (T )]

−

(1 − τ )c ⎤G(T )

r ⎥⎦
− e −rt (1 − ατ )[1 − F (T )]
B

(14)

where
2a

⎛ V ⎞
F (t , V , VB ) = N [h1 (t )] + ⎜ B ⎟ N [h2 (t )]
⎝ V ⎠
⎛ V ⎞
G(t ,V ,VB ) = ⎜ B ⎟
⎝ V ⎠

a− z

⎛ V ⎞
N [q1 (t )] + ⎜ B ⎟
⎝ V ⎠

a+ z

N [q 2 (t )]

and N (⋅) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. The parameters h1 (t ), h2 (t ),

q1 (t )and q2 (t ) are functions of personal taxes and their analytical forms can be found in

Liu et. al. (2006).

4c. Defining Yield and Spread
For a coupon bond with maturity T = tM, price P(T), and tax rate τ, the yield to maturity
Y(T,τ) at t0 can be obtained by solving the following equation:
M

P T = e −Y (T ,τ )T + ∑ ce −Y (T ,τ )ti

(15)

i =1

where ti is the time associated with the cash flow in the ith period and c is the coupon rate.
The yield spread is the difference between the yield on a corporate bond YC(T, τ) and that
on a Treasury YT(T, τF) with the same maturity T,

YS (T ) = Y C (T ,τ ) − Y T (T ,τ F )

(16)

Since corporate bonds are subject to default risk and state taxes while Treasury bonds are
not, yield on corporate bonds contains a premium to compensate investors for these
disadvantages.
4d. Rating Transition and Corporate Bond Spreads
So far the structural models are static in that they implicitly assume a bond would either
remain in the same rating or in default before maturity.15 It does not consider the
possibilities that a bond may end up in other different ratings at maturity. The markets are
15

This is because the asset volatility σ is treated as a constant in both the LT and the CG models over the
bond’s maturity and cannot be calibrated to match the default rate for multiple ratings at a time. The CG
model, in addition, is also calibrated to match only one rating’s leverage over the bond’s life. By doing so,
they all implicitly consider two possibilities – maintaining the same rating (with the same asset volatility σ
and leverage), or in default.
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quite different for investment-grade bonds and junk bonds, the possibility of rating
migration itself (especially across this border) would introduce unique market-related
risk16 which is not considered in the original structural models. Incorporating rating
transition risk accounts for the probability of a bond being downgraded and/or upgraded
before its maturity as well as the probability that a bond assigned one rating has financial
fundamentals or true credit risk more similar to bonds in other ratings. 17 In actual
procedure, we derive the 4- and 10-year transition matrices based on the 1-year risk
neutral estimate by Wei (2000). We assume the rating transition is a time-homogeneous
Markov process and smoothed the transition probabilities by normalizing the total
probability to one for the ratings we consider. This is a standard procedure that allows us
to remove the impact of migration to/from other ratings.18 The procedure involves two
steps as follows.
First, the models with taxes are calibrated strictly based on the rating-specific data in
Table 1. The spreads obtained in this manner are completely unaffected by rating
transitions and we use YS i to denote the generated spread for the ith rating.
Second, the transition matrices shown in Table 2 are applied to the spreads generated in
the first step. This is done with the follow approximation (with a slight abuse of the
summation sign),
B

YS i = YS i +

∑ (YS

j = AAA

j

− YS i )× aij

(17)

where YS i is the spread for the ith rating after we account for rating transitions, and aij is
the element of the transition matrix, which represents the cumulative probability of
migrating from the ith to the jth rating. Since the value of aij will be exogenously
determined, (17) is a reduced-form relationship. The added terms,

B

∑ (YS

j = AAA

j

− YS i )× aij ,

are modifications for rating transition effect. Essentially, (17) can be thought of as the
weighted average of all possible ratings a bond may end up with before maturity. This is
16

Imagine a BBB-rated bond being downgraded to BB, one immediate consequence is that many
institutional investors (such as pension funds and savings banks, etc.) holding this bond would have to
liquidate their holdings. Simply due to such an increase in supply, bond price would drop even though the
firm’s fundamentals have not changed much. Furthermore, with many institutional investors bailing out,
the issuer of this newly downgraded BB bond would find it much harder to raise new capital which in turn
makes the existing debt riskier. Therefore, the significantly higher default rate of junk bonds may be
partially attributed to this rating change.
17
There is evidence that rating changes lag rather than lead security-price changes. Wakeman (1981)
argues that rating changes merely provide “a single, easily communicated code that incorporates all the
major ingredients of the bond’s risk”. Kliger and Sarig (2000) point out that rating changes are triggered by
economic events, and therefore it is unclear how much of the price reaction to rating changes is due to the
rating announcement and how much is to triggering economic event itself.
18
This is designed to remove or reduce the biases in rating transition risk estimates due to not-rated
categories, firms withdrawn from ratings, and bankruptcy states.
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to overcome the shortcoming of the models that only one asset volatility σ (hence one
rating) is allowed. The linear form of (17) is used because the transition matrices are
under the risk neutral measure and any other form implies risk premium.
The resulting spreads YS i , where i ranges from AAA through B, are therefore generated
endogenously within our structural framework and reflect the impacts from all three
factors: default risk, taxes and transition risk.
5. Results and Analysis
In our simulation, the parameter values were chosen as close as possible to the original
models. For the CG model, we chose β = 0.1, δ = 0.06, σ = 0.2, η = 0.015, θ = 0.08, λ =
0.18, ς = – 0.2, φ = 2.8, ν = 0.6, L = 0.5 and the initial short rate r0 = 0.08. These
parameter values resemble those used by CG. In the numerical calculations, we set rL =
0.001 and rU = 0.18 as the lower and upper bounds for the range of the spot rate rt and
discretize this range into nr = 25 equal intervals. The coupon rate was set to 8%. For the
endogenous leverage model, we employed the same interest rate (r = 8%) and payout
ratio ( δ = 6 %) as used by LT. The bankruptcy cost rate was set to 20% of the firm value
as suggested by Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The coupon rate, c, is a decision variable,
which is optimally generated by the calibrated LT model.
5a. Yield Spreads Generated by the Models without Rating Transition Risk
Figure 1 reports the CG and LT model results for 4-year bonds with the personal tax rate
equal to 0% (i.e., Default risk only) and 23% (Default and taxes). The 23% personal tax
rate was chosen such that the equity return tax rate, estimated as a weighted average of
personal income and capital gains tax rates, i.e., τ E = (1 − δ )ατ + δτ , is equal to 12% as
estimated by Graham (1999). The results for τ = 10% and τ = 30% are available and have
similar properties to the results displayed here. The upper panels are expressed in basis
points and the lower panel in percentage of the observed values.
As seen in Figure 1, default risk alone explains very little in absolute terms or percentage
terms of the observed spread for high quality bonds. Personal taxes considerably
enhanced the model performance, especially for high quality bonds. For example with τ =
23%, the CG model explained 41 basis points of the observed spread on 4-year AAA
bonds compared to 0.6 basis points with no taxes. As rating decreases, the relative
improvement due to taxes becomes smaller. However, even for BBB bonds, taxes still
contribute at least an additional 44 basis points. The 4-year bond results of the LT model
display an analogous pattern to the CG model.
The results for the 10-year bonds are found in Figure 2 and mimic the 4-year bond results.
That is, default risk alone explains a small percentage of the spread while personal taxes
increase the model's performance for all bond ratings, especially high quality bonds. For
example, the CG model’s explanatory power increased from 3 to 45 basis points for AAA
bonds by incorporating income taxes, while the LT model can still improve its predictive
power by 15.8% on the BBB bonds.
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In summary, personal taxes are an important factor in explaining the spreads on the risky
bonds and after incorporating personal taxes the structural models do much better in
explaining the spreads on risky bonds.
5b. Evidence for the Rating Transition Risk
As shown in these Figures 3 and 4, structural models with personal taxes perform
significantly better than traditional models considering default risk only. Our study
supports this view. However, when we express the model-generated spreads as a
percentage of the observed values (shown in the lower panels), a troubling pattern
emerges. The model explanatory power after accounting for default risk and personal
taxes exhibited a strong rating-dependent pattern that cannot be readily explained by
liquidity risk.19 In particular, the curves showed the least explanatory power occurred at
the BBB rating: a feature that held true independent of bond maturities (i.e., true for 4and 10-year bonds), and the specific models used despite their drastic difference in the
capital structure assumptions. This is a highly uncomfortable result which does not match
financial intuition. That is, if only taxes and default risk are included, the remaining
unexplained spread attributable to liquidity would imply that junk bonds are more liquid
than most investment grade bonds.
In reality, there are regulations that prohibit certain institutional investors from investing
in junk bonds. When a bond is down-graded to BBB, its investors have increased
concerns that any further down-grading may result in a sudden relative increased supply
(from these restricted investors) which pushes down the bond price. This concern
warrants an additional premium that is not related to default risk (because BBB bond
ratings are not default states); not related to taxes (because tax treatments do not change);
and not strictly related to illiquidity (because BBB rating should be more liquid than junk
bond ratings). Thus, in order to capture the premium due to a possible rating change, we
incorporate rating transition risk into our models.
In addition to the strong evidence that liquidity is not the only missing factor, liquidity is
also the most elusive factor in asset pricing research because there is no accurate
quantified definition for it. 20 Accordingly, a model should first consider as many
important quantifiable factors as possible and understand their behaviors. This allows a
better understanding of the nature of the liquidity risk and the estimation of its magnitude.
In sum, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons for incorporating rating transition
risk in the model.

19

Previous studies, for example, de Jong et. al. (2005), and Liu et. al. (2006), have tended to implicitly
assume the portion of the spread that is unexplained by taxes and default risk comes from liquidity.
20
In most cases, asset pricing is done by assuming market completeness and no arbitrage. Liquidity is a
result of limited market of demand and supply. As a result it is hard, if not impossible, to “catch” the
liquidity factor in a structural arbitrage-free framework.
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Figure 1. Default and tax premiums on 4-year bonds. The upper panels show the observed and model-generated
spreads in bps. The lower panels express the model-generated spreads as a percentage of the observed values. The two
left panels are for the CG model (where leverage ratio is exogenously given) and the two right for the LT model (where
the model endogenously chooses the optimal capital structure). Notice that the explanatory power of both models
unanimously reaches the lowest level in percentage terms at BBB.
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10-Year Bonds: CG Model

10-Year Bonds: LT Model
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Figure 2. Default and tax premiums on 10-year bonds. The upper panels show the observed and model-generated
spreads. The lower panels express the model-generated spreads as a percentage of the observed values. The two left
panels are for the CG model (where leverage ratio is exogenously given) and the two right for the LT model (where the
model endogenously chooses the optimal capital structure). Notice that the explanatory power of both models
unanimously reaches the lowest level in percentage terms at BBB.
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5c. Rating Transition
Incorporating the rating transition factor should replace the rating-dependent liquidity
pattern with a new liquidity pattern that makes more intuitive sense. We also expect the
model to generate higher spreads for high-grade bonds and mitigate the possible
overshooting problem for low grade bonds. More specifically, the unexplained spread
attributed to liquidity should be smaller for high quality bonds and larger for low quality
bonds.
The overshooting problem of structural models has been documented in several studies
(e.g., Eom et. al. 2004). It manifests in two ways: (1) for junk bonds, the model may
appear to have a much larger explanatory power (even in percentage terms) for the
observed spreads; (2) the model-generated spreads may exceed the observed spreads,
especially for junk bonds. While the latter can be easily noticed, the former is more
subtle and may lead to spurious conclusion, which could be more harmful. We argue the
main reason for this overshooting problem is the neglecting of rating transition. In
previous structural models, it is implicitly assumed that a bond will either default with
cumulative default probability pd or remain in the same rating with probability 1 − p d
before maturity. There is no other scenario for a bond. However, it is well documented
that low-grade bonds have a net propensity to move up over time.21 In other words,
focusing only on the default probability (as in the previous structural models)
oversimplifies the situation and the “sunnier side” is ignored for low-grade bonds. That is,
the spread explained by default, taxes and rating transition will be smaller for low quality
bonds than found in a model with only default and taxes. Thus, we should expect the
overshooting problem to be mitigated after rating transitions is incorporated in the model.
By the same token, for high quality bonds, rating transition implies that beyond
remaining unchanged or default, the bond also has a probability to be downgraded before
maturity. Considering this alternative path of rating evolvement, we expect the rating
transition effect to further increase the model-generated spreads. For bonds in the middle
range of the rating spectrum, the overall effect of rating transition depends on which
factor is dominant (i.e., the influence of being upgraded or downgraded).
Figures 3 and 4 are the main results of our paper. Figure 3 presents spreads with and
without rating transitions. Figure 4 documents the implied liquidity premiums with and
without rating transitions. The results are exactly as we expected.
In Figure 3, the thin curve in each panel represents default risk and taxes to serve as a
comparison. The thick line shows the spreads (in percentage of the observed values) after
the rating transition is incorporated. Panels A1 and A2 (the upper two panels) are for the
CG model for 4-year and 10-year bonds respectively; Panels B1 and B2 (the lower two
panels) are for the LT model for 4-year and 10-year bonds respectively.
21

For example, Carty (1997) reports that “there is a relatively greater chance for a non-defaulting B-rated
issuer to enjoy a net upgrade than a non-defaulting Ba-rated issuer”.
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As desired, Figure 3 shows the three-factor model is able to explain a larger percentage of
the spread for high quality bonds. For B bonds, the model-explained portion drops after
the transition factor is incorporated. For example, the CG model’s explanatory power on
the B bonds drops from 92% to 61% for 4-year bonds. Stated differently, models with
only default and taxes would require relatively minuscule liquidity premiums for B bonds
to accurately match the observed default rates. Indeed, a reduction in the explained
spread for B bonds is required to both allow a liquidity premium and mitigated the
potential overshooting problem for the junk bonds.
Figure 4 documents the unexplained portion of the observed spreads, which is
attributable to illiquidity. The upper three panels are expressed in basis points and lower
three panels are in percentage of the total observed spreads. In Panel A1, the CG model
predicts a higher illiquidity premium (in basis points) on BB bonds than on other ratings
(including B bonds) for both 4- and 10-year maturity. This is the most direct evidence
that a model with default and taxes cannot satisfactorily explain the spreads by assigning
the unexplained portion to liquidity risk. Furthermore, when we express the results in
percentage terms (in Panels A2 and B2), both the CG and LT models demonstrated the
same pattern: the relative liquidity premium is highest on BBB. This serves as indirect
evidence of the rating transition factor we have focused on in this study. Panels C1 and
C2 present our results from both models for 4- and 10-year bonds after incorporating
rating transition risk. Indeed, not only did the model-inferred liquidity premium in basis
points move up as rating declines (in Panel C1), but this is also true in percentage terms
(shown by Panel C2 in contrast with A2 and B2).22
To summarize the findings, we note that the U-shape ratings-related pattern (with the
minimum at BBB) is basically removed.23 The model-explained portion of the observed
spreads goes up considerably for almost all ratings, especially for the BBB bonds. The
model’s relative explanatory power drops for the B bonds, which in fact helps to mitigate
the potential overshooting problem of these models for junk bonds. The improvements
range from a few to tens of percentage points.

22

Finally, we checked the results for sensitivity to the risk neutral transition matrix. For example, Guan
(2006) uses a different method to estimate the transition matrix. Carty (1997) and Altman et al (2004) draw
attention to the volatility of agency-rating migration matrix. We altered the elements in the base-case
matrix by a few to more than 10 percentage points. Again, the results are robust.
23
Although the CG model still shows a weak U-shape for the 4-year bonds, the model performance
increases by more than 10 percentage points, which is quite significant.
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Figure 3. Defaultable bond spreads with personal taxes with and without rating transition. The upper panels are
for the CG model and the lower for the LT model. The two left panels are for 4-year bonds and the two right for 10year bonds. The personal tax rate is chosen (23%) such that the equity return tax rate, estimated as a weighted average
of personal income and capital gains tax rates, i.e.,

τ E = (1 − δ )ατ + δτ ,

is equal to 12 percent estimated by

Graham (1999). We note that incorporating rating transition risk into the model considerably increases the explanatory
power of both models for all ratings (except B bonds); especially the U-shape pattern (dipping at BBB) is removed or
greatly reduced.

Financial Decisions, Spring 2015, Article 1
Model-Inferred Liquidity Premium
Upper panels: in bps. Lower panels: in percentage of the observed spreads
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Figure 4. Model-inferred liquidity premium. The upper panels are in basis points and the lower panels are expressed
in the percentage of the total observed spreads. In Panel A1, the CG model after calibrated with taxes implies that
liquidity premium is lower on B bonds than on some investment-grade bonds, a quite disturbing result. Notice the
hump-shapes pattern in Panels A2 and B2 is replaced with generally upward-sloping curves after the incorporation of
rating transition risk (shown in Panel C2), which is more consistent with the nature of ratings-liquidity relationship.

5d. Financial Crisis and Model Performance
The recent financial turmoil, especially the subprime crisis, has posed serious challenges
to financial industry and academia. To see how our model performs in light of these new
developments, we focus on a new sample period of 2004-2010. The main reason to
choose this sample period is data availability and a desire to challenge our model with the
2007-2009 subprime crisis. Table 3 shows the results. Panels A and B are for the CG
model over short-term and medium-term horizons, and C and D are for the LT model.
Following Rossi (2012), we report both short-term (one month to four years) and
medium-term (four year to ten year) horizons.
TABLE 3
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YIELD SPREADS AND LIQUIDIY PREMIUM: 2004-2010
This table shows the observed spreads (Rossi, 2012) for the period of 2004-2010 and the model-predicted values by
considering default risk, taxes, and rating transition. For example, “Default + Tax” means the model considers credit
risk, personal taxes, and their interactions jointly. The two right-hand-side columns are for results when all three factors
are considered. The implied liquidity premium is reported in the relative term as a percentage of the total observed
spreads. Default rate and rating transition data used for model calibration and model implementation are from S&P
Global Credit Portal (2011) covering 1981 through 2010. Following Rossi (2012), we present two horizons, short- and
medium-term horizons representing average of yield spreads for 1 month to 4 years, and 4 years to 10 years,
respectively.

(A) CG Model, T = short-term
Rating
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

Observed
Spreads (bps)
67
103
158
343
429

Default + Tax
Spreads
Liquidity
(bps)
premium (%)
43
36
58
44
84
47
317
8
450
5

Default + Tax + Transition
Spreads
Liquidity
(bps)
premium (%)
51
24
72
30
122
23
289
16
352
18

(B) CG Model, T = medium-term
Rating
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

Observed
Spreads (bps)
80
111
235
412
558

Def + Tax
Spreads
(bps)
61
77
98
301
590

Liquidity
premium (%)
24
31
58
27
-6

Def + Tax + Transition
Spreads
Liquidity
(bps)
premium (%)
82
-3
111
0
168
29
289
30
397
29

(C) LT Model, T = short-term
Rating
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

Observed
Spreads (bps)
67
103
158
343
429

Def + Tax
Spreads
(bps)
64
89
124
330
416

Liquidity
premium (%)
4
14
22
4
3

Def + Tax + Transition
Spreads
Liquidity
(bps)
premium (%)
70
4
102
1
154
3
299
13
344
20

(D) LT Model, T = medium-term
Rating
AA
A
BBB
BB
B

Observed
Spreads (bps)
80
111
235
412
558

Def + Tax
Spreads
(bps)
83
94
114
282
568

Liquidity
premium (%)
-4
15
51
32
-2

Def + Tax + Transition
Spreads
Liquidity
(bps)
premium (%)
90
-13
115
-4
175
26
284
31
421
25

20
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Similar to our main findings using an earlier dataset (1973-1993), the structural models
with personal taxes and default risk imply a U-shaped unexplained portion of the
observed spreads. In other words, the models imply the greatest (percentage) liquidity
premium for BBB rating. For example, in Panel C for the LT model, without rating
transition, liquidity premium accounts for about 4% of the total yield spreads for AA, BB
and B bonds, while it becomes 22% for BBB bond. All four cases share this characteristic.
As we argue earlier, this pattern of model-implied liquidity premium is hard to explain,
given the fact that investment-grade bonds are far more liquid than junk bonds. However,
if we further incorporate rating transition, the U-shaped pattern of the liquidity premium
vanishes. Out of the four cases we investigate, three show a clear increase of liquidity
premium as bond rating declines. The only case that does not show this trend is the CG
model for the short-term bonds. However, it still makes a significant relative
improvement versus the very counter-intuitive pattern found when ignoring rating
transitions. These findings once again show that incorporating rating transition in the
structural framework indeed makes a desirable and essential improvement.
The recent budget crisis in the U.S. resulted in an unprecedented downgrade of the
government debt. This certainly casts a system-wide impact on the debt market and
beyond, including the corporate and international bond markets. Bond yields would be
affected across the board. However, as long as we still use the yield on the government
bond as the baseline even if we no longer consider it risk-free rate, corporate yield
spreads would not be affected as much. In other words, we expect our model to perform
reasonably well under the shadow of the U.S. budget crisis, which looms over the
foreseeable future.
5e. Model Limitations: Financial Crisis and International Market
The approach we propose has its limitations. For example, in one case shown in Panel D
of Table 3, after incorporating rating transition, the LT model implies -13% and -4%
liquidity premium. for AA and A ratings, respectively. Certainly, a negative value makes
no sense. Instead, it means that our model has overshot its yield prediction for these two
ratings.
The financial crisis has brought system-wide turmoil, which may reveal a limitation in
our approach. During a crisis as serious as the subprime loan crisis, market moves
violently and the volatility would be poorly captured by the common (geometric)
Brownian motion. This is the well-known fat-tail distribution of risk. Brownian motion,
relatively easier and more tractable, tends to describe routine, small and independent risks
better. When the whole market is experiencing a crisis, psychology and irrationality can
no longer be assumed away and market-wide herding effect becomes more pronounced.
Some of these effects may be better captured by more complicated mechanisms, such as
Levy process.
International environment poses another limitation. Specifically, different countries may
have quite different tax practices. Our approach is strictly based on the U.S. tax
environment. How to adjust the tax treatment in the model for different countries remains
21

Financial Decisions, Spring 2015, Article 1
to be a significant challenge. For example, China is removing taxes on corporate bonds.
Australia uses the imputation system where personal tax is linked to the amount of
corporate tax a specific company pays. In other words, personal tax depends on how
much corporate tax the issuing corporation pays, which is quite different from the US’s
tax system. In addition to the tax complication, political risk can be come a major
concern when we move from the domestic to international environment. Furthermore,
currency exchange rate risk can be a daily concern for firms operating globally. Once
again, these risks are real but not captured by our approach. Some of them, perhaps the
exchange rate risk, may be relatively easier to model within the structural framework.
Others are considerably more difficult to reliably address and therefore may require
different methodology.
6. Conclusions
The spreads generated by structural models for defaultable and taxable bonds reveal a
strong rating-related pattern that cannot be characterized by liquidity. We argue existing
structural models suffer from a perilous weakness. Quite simply, they implicitly only
allow two states of nature: default and no default without rating changes, whereas the
probability of bonds being upgraded/downgraded is ignored in the current structural
models. We design a framework that combines the structural models with rating
transition risk to account for this missing factor, the overall model performance is
considerably improved: it explains more of the observed spreads on investment-grade
ratings not only in basis points but also in the relative percentage terms, and on the other
hand mitigates the overshooting problem exhibited by some structural models for junk
bonds. Most importantly, we are able to remove the unreasonable rating-specific pattern
in the implied liquidity premium. By capturing the risk of rating migration, significantly
more sensible results are obtained. That is, the unexplained portion of the total spreads is
consistent with the nature of liquidity risk. This paper's noteworthy findings are a
moderate step forward in exploring the credit spread puzzle.
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